DRAFT 3 radical democracy that became dominant under Jackson and Van Buren. Instead, he insisted on the centrality of law to republican government and hesitated to assume that the people could always be trusted to respect the essential restraints of reason and legal tradition. He adhered to a radical states' rights position from the earliest days of his public life to the last. And, all his life, he struggled intellectually with the challenges that slavery presented to the states' allegedly republican experiments, never doubting the deep wrongness of the institution but always defending the autonomy of the states, even as that came to mean the ever-deeper entrenchment of slavery. Van Buren and Jackson would ultimately leave Jefferson behind in their embrace of party-based democracy, but, however inadvertently, Jefferson laid out much of the road to that destination, including its doomed method for dealing with slavery, over the course of his long public career. This essay will elucidate Jefferson's constitutional thought across a half century of constitutional development. Given space constraints, it will be highly selective. It will first discuss his revolutionary tract, the Summary View, a foundational document of American federalism. Then, it will turn to his one book, his Notes on the State of Virginia, which, among other matters, explored the internal constitution of a republic (as opposed to the larger confederation of republics). Remarkably democratic for its time, it nevertheless elevated law and constitutional structures like the separation of powers above democracy and the "sovereign" people. The Notes also tried to face up to some of the powerfully antirepublican effects of slavery, but it offered no solutions. Finally, this essay will discuss some political events of the 1790s and 1800s that are particularly useful in illuminating Jefferson's reluctant movement-as well as the limits on that movement--in the direction of democracy and party organization. The essential themes, DRAFT 4 then, in this account of Jefferson's constitutional thought are democratization and its relation to the rule of law, the emergence of party, federalism (states' rights), and slavery.
Jefferson's Summary View and the Origins of American Federalism
Jefferson's commitment to federalism appeared even before the Revolution. As the imperial crisis reached a boil in the mid-1770s, Jefferson wrote A Summary View of the Rights of British America, which was published as a pamphlet to promote resistance to British pretensions. The essay does not lack for the vindications of natural rights that one might expect from a revolutionary pamphlet. For example, Jefferson identifies "a right which nature has given to all men, of departing from the country in which chance, not choice, has placed them, of going in quest of new habitations, and of there establishing new societies," as well as those "rights of human nature, deeply wounded by
[the] infamous practice" of slavery. 4 Nevertheless, as Peter Onuf argues, the pamphlet's essential argument is not a defense of a natural right to self-government alone. It is a defense of republican federalism as a theory of the British Empire. Written as a propaganda piece, it perhaps aimed less for descriptive, historical accuracy-few people before 1774 would have had the temerity to suggest that the British Empire was simply a league of equal states-than at integrating the colonists' emergent republicanism with their continued commitment (as of 1774) to the British Empire. But, as much as it was a creature of its moment, the Summary View adumbrated the essentials of the confederal structure that Jefferson would advocate for the rest of his life, not only reading them into the imperial structure of 1774 but finding them in the Constitution's embrace of federalism in 1787 as well. 5 Jefferson's opening paragraph characterized the colonies not as George's "colonies" but as "these his states" 6 -this, two years before the colonies declared independence. Claiming that Britain had never assisted the American emigrants in the settlement of their new lands, he insisted that British Americans' continuing bond with Britain was strictly limited and a matter of choice: "settlements having been thus effected in the wilds of America, the emigrants thought proper to adopt that system of laws under which they had hitherto lived in the mother country, and to continue their union with her by submitting themselves to the same common sovereign, who was thereby made the central link connecting the several parts of the empire . . ." 7 Americans voluntarily chose to hold onto the monarchy as the essential link in a federal system, in which each local legislature-Parliament included-rightly legislated only for its own domestic constituency. Jefferson did not hesitate to catalogue the alleged, substantive injustices of Parliament's American legislation, which purported to subordinate American interests and rights to British. But he emphasized that the American claim was not a claim to substantively fair treatment by Parliament but a constitutional claim to complete independence from Parliament:
[W]e do not point out to his majesty the injustice of these acts, with intent to rest on that principle the cause of their nullity; but to shew that experience confirms the propriety of those political principles which exempt us from the jurisdiction of the British parliament. The true ground on which we declare these acts void is, that the British parliament has no right to exercise authority over us.
. . . Can any one reason be assigned why 160,000 electors in the island of Great Britain should give law to four millions in the states of America . . . ?
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The British Empire was not a metropolitan empire with authority concentrated at the center but a network of equal and independent republics-a confederation--linked only by the monarchy.
And so the Summary View looked to the monarchy to rectify the wrongs attempted by Parliament. But why did Jefferson accept a constitutional role for the King at all in a rapidly republicanizing America? Because republicanism required federalism, and federalism required a federal head. Jefferson's theory of republicanism held that the freedom and prosperity of each political community depended on the existence of a central authority, empowered to preserve peace and commerce among otherwise independent states. Thus, "we do earnestly entreat his majesty, as yet the only mediatory power between the several states of the British empire, to recommend to his parliament of Great Britain the total revocation of these acts, which, however nugatory they be, may yet prove the cause of further discontents and jealousies among us," 9 and he endorsed the King's constitutional authority to employ the veto to prevent such unequal laws.
But, in fact, George had already exposed his unwillingness to serve as an space to considerations of the character that must be fostered in a sovereign people, of the nature of leadership in a republic, of the challenge of slavery to republicanism, and of the preeminence of law-even over the will of the people-in rendering a society republican.
Moreover, the ideas developed here remained largely stable over the course of Jefferson's life, although some significant development will be discussed in the next section.
If the people were to be sovereign and their will always to be obeyed, Jefferson nevertheless implied that that will must be just to be truly republican and that, to be just, that will must emanate from a people whose character had been properly fostered. likely, in fact, to lead eventually to full-scale insurrection:
There must doubtless be an unhappy influence on the manners of our people produced by the existence of slavery among us. The whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. . . . The man must be a prodigy who can retain his manners and morals undepraved by such circumstances. . . . . With the morals of the people, their industry also is destroyed. For in a warm climate, no man will labour for himself who can make another labour for him. . . .
[We can only hope somehow] for a total emancipation, and that this is disposed, in the order of events, to be with the consent of the masters, rather than by their extirpation.
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Jefferson's hopes were bolstered somewhat by Virginia's ban on slave importation, a first step to undermining "this great political and moral evil, while the minds of our citizens may be ripening for a complete emancipation of human nature." 18 But he always insisted that emancipation be gradual and accompanied by colonization because of his deeply racist conviction that free blacks and free whites could not live together without entering into a war that would end in the "extermination of the one or the other race." he also seemed to consider established principles of law more important than the will of the people. Jefferson's reverence for law is manifest in his discussion of the defects in the first Virginia Constitution. Here, he emphasized that the constitution must not simply guarantee the supremacy of popular will but must supply a mechanism by which law would hem in the legislature and by which law would guide and structure the people's will.
In particular, he objected to the constitution's failure adequately to separate powers and thus to equip each branch of government to enforce the legal limits on the other branches' authority: "All the powers of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government." Without proper, functional separation, the government was not limited by law: "An elective despotism was not the government we Virginia's "ordinance of government"-he was not willing to call it a "constitution"-nominally adopted just such a separation of powers but left executive and judicial salaries and tenure in the hands of the legislature. It thus undermined the other branches'
capacities to defend the law against legislative incursions.
He thought the constitution a mere "ordinance" not only because it failed to impose legal limits on government but because of its method of adoption. Jefferson claimed that the provisional, ad hoc legislature elected in April 1776, which produced the ordinance/constitution, was never elected for the special purpose of forming a constitution. At the time of the election, no voter contemplated such a thing because Virginia's independence had not yet been declared nor decided upon in the public mind.
For Jefferson, the absence of specific authorization from the voters to form a constitution deprived that body's emergency enactment of the legal status of a constitution, notwithstanding its being "entitled a Constitution or Form of Government." 25 Instead, every newly elected legislature had power to alter the constitution, and sometimes had done so, rather than feeling itself constrained by a constitution imposed from without. or practice to place legal limits on government actors and especially legislatures. Thus the employment of a constitutional convention rather than a legislature might be enough, even though each body derived its power from the same electorate, since the people's purposes were presumably different in the two cases. Neither such a convention nor popular ratification was essential, but some such evidence of wide acceptance was indispensable. Thus, in trying to delegitimate the Virginia Constitution of 1776,
Jefferson chose to attack the evidence of popular acceptance offered by defenders of the constitution rather than assert that some formal legal procedure had been skipped. In the event, the law of prevailing practice went against Jefferson, and Virginia's 1776
Constitution remained in place and fully functioning until the constitutional revision of 1830.
Had Jefferson been a real democrat of the Jacksonian sort, he would have proposed constitutional reforms for giving the people at large an ever more active and close control over their officeholders. But, for Jefferson, problems with the content of the constitution and its mode of adoption demonstrated not inadequate popular control but an inadequate legal structure to bind the government: "Our situation is indeed perilous, and I hope my countrymen . . . will apply, at a proper season, the proper remedy; which is a convention to fix the constitution, to amend its defects, to bind up the several branches of government by certain laws, which when they transgress their acts shall become nullities;
to render unnecessary an appeal to the people, or in other words, a rebellion, on every infraction of their rights . . . ." 26 In this very pre-Jacksonian quotation, he seeks to avoid appeals to the people, which he equates with "rebellion," and looks instead to the discipline of clear law.
26 Notes, 129.
This preoccupation with law, of course, necessarily implied a concern with enforcement mechanisms. In the quotation just above, Jefferson seemed implicitly to look to the judiciary to render legislative transgressions "nullities." In principle, he referred to the obligation of each branch to control the other two where it could. But the most salient mechanism would be the specifically judicial refusal to implement unconstitutional statutes, a power that he again embraced just a few years later when advocating the inclusion of a bill of rights in the federal constitution.
Concomitantly, he revealed a skepticism that the people at large could or would (or should) do much to roll back usurpations by this or that branch of government. They might be roused to demand a constitutional convention and might (rarely) rebel against a long train of oppressions, but they wouldn't be much good at resisting the slow accumulation of unconstitutional power in the government. 27 For that, reliance had to be placed on well-designed legal mechanisms-"bind[ing] up the several branches of government by certain laws"--that would empower each branch to defend its own prerogatives.
I will not discuss Jefferson's passionate defenses of freedom of religion, but it was at the end of one such defense in the Notes that he eloquently summed up the practical relationship between the people's severely limited constitutional capacities and those of the constitution itself as a specifically legal document:
It can never be too often repeated, that the time for fixing every essential right on a legal basis is while our rulers are honest, and ourselves united. From the conclusion of this war we shall be going down hill. It will not then be necessary to resort every moment to the people for support. They will be forgotten, therefore, and their rights disregarded. themselves, but in the sole faculty of making money, and will never think of uniting to effect a due respect for their rights. The shackles, therefore, which shall not be knocked off at the conclusion of this war will remain on us long, will be made heavier and heavier, till our rights shall revive or expire in a convulsion.
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In short, the people might be sovereign, but only clear foundational law-not the suffrage and not a right of rebellion-would ensure an adequate regard for their rights. These letters seem to confirm that Jefferson was less concerned with ensuring the democratic quality of the Constitution than ensuring adequate legal checks on the exercise of power. First, in spite of his wariness of centralized power, he readily supported this effort to strengthen the national government within its limited sphere.
Despite some reservations, 29 he did not go in with the Antifederalists, a motley but nearly victorious group of oppositionists who generally shared his confederal principles.
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Rather, he firmly supported a Constitution that his friend Madison and the other delegates had designed as a mechanism not for enhancing popular power but for maximizing the chances that public-spirited gentlemen would be placed in power and, once there, that they would be suitably policed by other officeholders and by structural checks. and on which they might found a resistance when necessary. But he doubted that the "parchment barriers" of a bill of rights would really make much difference. 32 Jefferson disagreed, however, famously educating his friend on the importance of judicial review, a legal mechanism of constitutional enforcement that Madison had neglected: "In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit one which has great weight with me; the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." 33 Celebrating the "learning and integrity" that he thought would characterize any independent judiciary, he easily imagined the judges regularly and effectively standing in the way of usurpation, something he could not easily imagine of the people themselves. But to do that in the normal course, the judges (like the state legislatures) needed clear legal texts in the form of a written constitution and bill of rights.
With Madison ultimately on board, the amendments that we now call the Bill of Rights were soon added to the Constitution, but I want to emphasize that they were not seen simply as guarantees of individual rights. They were just as much understood as protections for the states against overreaching by the national government. Mimicking the confederalism of the Summary View, Jefferson's draft defended this state power. He declared it obvious that the Constitution was a "compact" among the sovereign, independent states, which created "a general government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government." 37 The draft inferred from this premise a state right to nullify certain federal laws. While Jefferson's opponents denied that any state could unilaterally nullify a federal act, Jefferson insisted that the general government was a mere "creature" 38 of a compact among the states, such that its alleged usurpations could be judged only by the parties to the compact, the states themselves. He oddly accepted that an "abuse of the delegated powers" (emphasis added) would call only for a judgment by the people at the next election: "a change by the people would be the constitutional remedy." 39 But an assumption of altogether undelegated powers justified resort to nullification: "where powers are assumed which have not been delegated a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy: that every state has a natural right, in cases not within the compact . . . to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits: that without this right, they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might exercise this right of judgment for them."
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Moreover, he expected that, "the costates . . . will concur in declaring these acts void & of no force & will each take measures of it's own for providing that . . . these acts, . . . Jefferson thus eagerly followed the logic of sovereignty from the Summary View to its natural conclusion. Still, enchanting as his logic was, Jefferson could see that it might lead all the way to disunion and ultimately pulled back from the precipice.
Loosening his grip on rigid confederalist principle, he called for the prudent, though not legally required, step of consultation among the "parties to the compact" to produce a collective remedy for federal illegalities.
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In some ways, these resolutions fell stillborn. Kentucky, for its part, adopted
Jefferson's legal logic but excised the argument for nullification, merely requesting that
Congress repeal the statute and calling on the states to correspond on the issue. Worse, no other legislature joined Kentucky and Virginia in any of their resolutions. The "costates," the "parties to the compact," seemed to have forgotten the Summary View.
Yet, in other ways, the resolutions proved of major importance. They turned out to be a critical step in the development of American constitutional dynamics. They did not establish the constitutional authority of state legislatures nor a doctrine of nullification (although that doctrine would make a notorious, slavery-defending comeback in the 1830s). But they did play an important role, largely unintended though it was, in advancing democratic politics and party organization. In the words of Koch and antiparty values as long as it limited itself to an ad hoc defense of a fundamental (Apr., 1948), pp. 145-176, 147 Jefferson out of office. Predictably enough, this shameless disregard for the will of the people only cemented the Jeffersonian view of the Federalists as monarchists and aristocrats. In this crisis, the prospect of a resort to arms was a real one until a small crack in the ranks of the Federalists opened the door to Jefferson's peaceful installation.
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The following passage from Jefferson's first inaugural address reflects both the severity of the political contest and Jefferson's determination to overcome rather than institutionalize the party conflict. It nicely summarizes his desire for unity rather than party division, his principled deference to popular will, but also his commitment to law as perhaps the only thing more fundamental to republican government than was the authority of the people:
During the contest of opinion through which we have past, the animation of discusions and of exertions has sometimes worn an aspect which might impose on strangers unused to think freely, and to speak and to write what they think; but this being now decided by the voice of the nation, announced according to the rules of the constitution, all will of course arrange themselves under the will of the law, and unite in common efforts for the common good. All too will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression. . . . And let us reflect that having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance, as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. Inaugural, "We are all republicans: we are all federalists"; that is, that virtually all Americans shared the republican principle of representative government and the federalist principle of states' rights within a strong union. For him, the Constitution was sufficiently clear about these principles that there could be no room for ongoing party conflict if all would simply demonstrate a due regard for law.
During his presidency, moreover, he again manifested a special regard for clear constitutional law as essential to a republican constitution. Again in his First Inaugural, he not only emphasized the necessity of "equal laws" as a condition on the raw power of majority will, but he also pointed to a popular regard for law as the quality that made the American government "the strongest Government on earth. I believe it the only one, where every man, at the call of the law, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern." Further, Jefferson emphasized that public law must be clear and readily enforceable so that it might genuinely discipline officeholders rather than just providing occasions for sophistical interpretation. This attitude can be seen in Jefferson's most important act as President, the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory. While few doubted the constitutional power of the President and Senate to add territory to the nation by way of treaty, Jefferson could not satisfy himself that anything in the Constitution actually authorized the acquisition with sufficient clarity. Jefferson insisted that, When an instrument admits two constructions, the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise, the other indefinite, I prefer that which is safe & precise. I had rather ask an enlargement of power from the nation, where it is found necessary, than to assume it by a construction which would make our powers boundless. Our peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.
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In the end, he allowed himself to be convinced that the acquisition was so important to the future of republican government that he should put aside his scruples. But those scruples nicely demonstrate that he deemed law at least as fundamental as popular distinguish itself from "the aristocracy"-had to be more than a kind of political militia, reserved for rare constitutional emergencies. Instead, it had to become the chief governing agency of the nation, even more fundamental and constitutional than the particular government institutions mandated by the constitutional text itself. The party, as the immediate tool of the people, would be the source of nominees for public office as well as the source of policy positions and instructions for ensuring that officeholders did precisely the will of the people. In this vision, there was no room for Madison's filtration and refinement of popular opinion and enabling of statesmen, nor for Jefferson's similar ideal of rule by a natural aristocracy, even one chosen directly by the people. Rather, the people were themselves to rule as directly as possible. Officeholders were to be chosen for their fidelity to the party and rotated out of office regularly, vindicating the postulate that ability was less important than was close identification with the desires of the people.
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Jefferson, in contrast, for all his sincere declarations of the supremacy of the people's will, had had no thought of creating an institution that might allow the people to articulate their will with regularity and clarity. Jefferson was probably the most democratic figure among the eminent men of his generation, but his inherited opposition to party and his lawyerly preoccupation with clear and equal law proved especially salient principles of his republicanism. And these principles conditioned his democratic inclinations in ways that separated him from his radical successors. He was also the greatest champion of states' rights in his generation and a pretty radical champion at that, never really giving up on the confederal model built in the Summary View. Unfortunately, his commitment to states' rights came to have its most dramatic effect in preserving slavery. In the slave states, even avowed opponents of slavery like Jefferson mostly proved incapable of turning against their own self-interest to eliminate it. Meanwhile, the doctrines born from the Summary View, proved decisive for as many northerners as southerners, blunting all anti-slavery efforts from outside the South and leaving another generation to bear the awful cost of beginning the republican experiment anew.
